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THE PRACTICE OF MODERN DIPLOMACY
PHILIP C. HABIB*
Throughout the day as I have listened to the other speakers I
have been noting points they have made that I intended to make as
well. It is difficult to sit in the presence of the kind of erudition and
plain intellectual capacity that I face this morning and to pick and
choose from what I had intended to discuss. But what I am going
to talk about today is the practice of modern diplomacy, both in
structural and procedural terms.
There should be no doubt that the practice of what I call
"modern diplomacy" does not fall into the traditional mold. Mod-
em diplomacy has evolved into a modern mold with, in many re-
spects, changed norms of behavior. The traditional definition of
diplomacy as the conduct of foreign affairs of a sovereign nation
really no longer applies. Diplomacy is not simply the process by
which nations deal with each other; the role of the diplomat is no
longer simply to represent his sovereign in the court of another sov-
ereign. Diplomacy has now become so related to foreign policy
and to the process of foreign policymaking that the diplomat is as
much involved in the foreign policy process as he is in the process
of conducting foreign relations.
As you know, foreign policy is a continuing process rather
than an end in itself. And in the fullest sense, the foreign policy
process that we follow today - which is reflected in the practice of
modern diplomacy - includes the formulation of policy decisions
that affect the direction the country is going to take and the imple-
mentation of those aspects of the national interest that are involved
with our relations with other nations. So, I would not argue that
diplomacy is only implementation, because that is not the way a
diplomat works. We must realize that we are no longer in the age
of Nicholson, and that there is no way to conduct that very delicate
minuet that was once characteristic of diplomacy. The diplomat
today and the practice of diplomacy are concerned with foreign
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policy in the fullest sense. Hence, in discussing the practice of mod-
em diplomacy, I usually start with a brief outline of the process of
foreign policymaking in the United States.
The making of foreign policy today is a long way from what
the founding fathers envisioned or, for that matter, from what was
imagined in pre-World War II days. Today, diplomacy is charac-
terized by a dispersion of authority and responsibility. And there is
probably a good deal less flexibility than there should be and a
good deal more free-wheeling in the field of foreign policy and for-
eign affairs and, therefore, in diplomacy. There are forces which
attack this flexibility which make it difficult to arrive at a consen-
sus. This, in turn, makes diplomacy today an entirely new experi-
ence.
There are really two particular types of consensus I am talking
about. The first is the usual one that people are concerned with -
that is, a consensus of what the United States should be doing -
what tack we should take in a particular situation. In short, the first
is a national consensus on the actions that are being taken. But the
second type of consensus of which I speak traditionally was very
important in the practice of diplomacy and in the practice of for-
eign policy. It was a consensus that the public had confidence and
faith that our governments conduct was defensible. The credibility,
authority, and responsibility of the personalities involved were sub-
ject to much less questioning and scrutiny. There was a form of
national acceptance in the field of foreign affairs that the govern-
ment knew what it was doing and that the government was pursu-
ing national interests. Corrections or adjustments that had to be
made were accommodated by the process of government which al-
lowed these to be made in a rational way.
Today, however, I maintain that neither form of consensus ex-
ists. This in turn creates problems for the modern diplomat. The
formulation of foreign policy today is a governmental process
which involves the executive - the President and the National Se-
curity Council - the heads of the major departments, and our bu-
reaucracy both at home and abroad. Modern diplomacy is no
longer organized solely within the State Department by a small
cadre of people who know each other very well and who deal di-
rectly with the President on all issues. Rather, a system now exists
in which other departments of government have an interest not
only in the formulation of foreign policy, but in the decisionmaking
process as well as the ultimate implementation of the decisions that
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are made. A second branch of government - Congress - has de-
veloped a degree of authority which I will not speak about in any
detail, because it has been discussed at length in the press for sev-
eral years. The Congress, either through its budget control, its in-
vestigative authority, its legislative authority, or the exercise of its
constitutional advisory authority, has created a role which probably
was not envisioned by the Constitution. And despite what one
might wish, I do not see this changing in the foreseeable future.
Although one may not like the War Powers Act, for example, it
would take a great deal to change it. So that Congress' role has
placed limitations on the conduct of foreign policy.
As a result, the conduct of foreign policy is now subject to a
body of law. Of course, the constitutional law in this area is not
new, but there is now a body of law in the form of legislation that
has served to perfect the conduct of foreign policy and which, in the
last few years, has been designed to restrict the authority of the
executive. Generally speaking, this body of law has asserted a role
of the Congress which has detracted from the traditional powers of
the President in the conduct of foreign affairs.
In addition to these changes, however, foreign policymaking is
now dramatically affected by nongovernmental processes - that is
to say, the media, special interest groups, the academic community,
indeed, public opinion itself has become a part of the nongovern-
mental processes that affect the conduct of foreign policy. The
manner in which something is presented in the leading journals or
in the wire-service reports has a profound influence on the conduct
of foreign policy. There is the question of investigative reporting;
the problems posed by the new freedom of information legislation.
How much does the government have to say at a given moment in
time? At what point does secrecy infringe upon the right of the
people to know? At what point does the right of the people to know
infringe upon the secrecy necessary to conduct sensible negotiations
in a complex world? These questions have not been answered, of
course. But what is certain is that these nongovernmental processes
have become as significant in the practice of diplomacy as any legal
framework that seeks to define the manner in which diplomats be-
have or the conduct of government within agreed parameters.
Thus, one has to conclude that the issues of modern diplomacy
have not only become complex, but they have become so enmeshed
in our social and governmental structures that there is no longer
exclusivity in the conduct of diplomacy. Indeed, modern diplo-
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macy cannot be exclusive. It is more open that it has ever been
before, and I suspect that this trend will continue.
In addition to the domestic forces which shape the contour of
our foreign diplomacy, the issues of modem diplomacy have
shifted from an almost exclusively bilateral or regional arena to a
global arena. We no longer deal exclusively in terms of regional
alliances or bilateral agreements. We have reached a stage now
where we must deal with global issues and global needs in a man-
ner which did not become a part of our diplomacy until the post-
World War II era. I am speaking of such issues as: development;
the North-South relationship; the environment; problems of nu-
clear proliferation and the control over normal, peaceful nuclear
use; and, the question of morality, of human rights. These issues
are now involved in the practice of modem diplomacy to an extent
beyond our conceptions in the past. This is not to suggest necessar-
ily that these issues are easy to deal with in modem diplomacy.
What I am saying is that we cannot refuse to deal with these issues.
The United States cannot now retreat from the very advanced posi-
tion that has been taken on human rights as a global issue. How
countries deal with each other-on a daily basis on narrow issues is
another matter. But as a global expression of what the United
States stands for, which is what I think President Carter had in
mind when he injected human rights as the pillar of his foreign
policy, there is no turning back. I am not so sure we should turn
back; indeed, I do not think we should.
The recognition and acceptance of world interdependence is
now so commonplace that people do not realize the tremendous
effect it has on the practice of modem diplomacy. Because the area
of international cooperation is relatively new, a great deal is yet to
be developed in the practice of modem diplomacy. Its systems re-
quire a great deal of development. Whether one talks of regional
or global issues, bilateralism or multilateralism, the organizational
problems that still plague us in multilateral organizations such as
the United Nations have not yet been substantially established in
the long-term sense. There are many adjustments that will have to
be made as the practice of diplomacy becomes more modernized.
Let us speak briefly about the influence of international law on
the practice of modern diplomacy. As you know, I am not a law-
yer, and hence I must admit a lack of familiarity with the role of
international law. But I was always very careful to have a lawyer
accompany me when I felt I needed one, whether I was negotiating
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a status of forces agreement or dealing with the Vietnam negotia-
tions in Paris. From the outset, our delegation in Paris, of which I
was a member, had a legal adviser who participated in the entire
process. In the early stages it was Carl Salans, who was later suc-
ceeded by George Aldrich.
Now the function of the legal adviser was to advise the diplo-
mat on how to meet the diplomat's needs. That is, we looked upon
him as a person we could depend on to develop instruments that
were useful to us in the process we were going through. These in-
struments, of course, were not always treaties or agreements, and
they were not always necessarily legally binding. In modern diplo-
macy, as it has been practiced in recent years, there continues to be
a certain value in ambiguity. But it is also useful to establish proce-
dures and to draft instruments that can be adhered to as a clear
expression of understanding between the parties concerned. There
is a risk, of course, when this is done - the risk that at a later stage
it will be rejected by your negotiating partners. This has happened
on many occasions. Yet, the legal adviser has the ability to take
what has been agreed upon and to translate it into binding lan-
guage. This technical task exemplifies one role of the international
lawyer.
Another example can be drawn from the first round of the
Vietnam negotiations in 1968 when we sought to negotiate a total
bombing halt with the North Vietnamese in preparation for a full-
scale peace settlement. There were a few obstacles in the negotiat-
ing process. We had gone there with the expectation that we would
move very quickly to full-scale negotiations and ultimately to a
peace conference. But we had to be assured that the full-scale ne-
gotiations would include all parties; the North Vietnamese, you will
remember, refused to negotiate with the government in Saigon.
And we wanted assurances that, in the wake of these meetings to
stop the bombing, the North Vietnamese would not take advantage
of the circumstances militarily.
Now, the lawyers could draft instruments that would bring
about these two desirable goals, but it was futile to draft such in-
struments because the other side would not sign on the bottom line.
We could have waited them out, but that was not the purpose of the
negotiations. So we fell back on the system of so-called "under-
standings" which fulfilled the function we had in mind. These were
simply statements that we understood that they understood what
we meant and vice versa. These are the famous "understandings"
1979
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that were repudiated so many times but which allowed us to move
forward to the next stage of negotiations. So in this type of situa-
tion, the role of international law in modern diplomacy is to at-
tempt to harmonize policies without codifying them. When an
agreement cannot be codified, an attempt should be made to har-
monize national policies as if they were codified and then simply let
events run their course. A good example of this is found in the
Nuclear Suppliers Club. To reach a comprehensive agreement at
this point in time on the control over the shipment of supplies of
nuclear equipment is virtually impossible. But there have been cer-
tain understandings that have come up through the Nuclear Suppli-
ers Club which, although not codified, have served to harmonize
national policies. This is important in modern diplomacy.
Another approach, of colyse, is to establish certain rules of be-
havior which might lead to codification at a later date. This hap-
pens frequently. An example that comes to mind is the
atmospheric testing moratorium which took effect before the treaty
itself. It is also possible to codify laws in bilateral agreements
which will then be followed or adhered to by other countries. The
Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, evolved out of a bilateral or
a small multilateral setting and then expanded outwards, and I sus-
pect that the future Test Ban Treaty will evolve in much the same
manner. The treaties we are trying to conclude with the Soviets
covering agreements on radiological warfare, or any of the other
series of current negotiations with the Soviets, could be agreed
upon bilaterally or within a small multilateral setting and then ex-
panded outward.
But in the end, there are overriding political considerations
that must be dealt with, and this is the area where the diplomat
always falls back. The diplomat recognizes the importance of law,
cooperation, organization, and procedures, but ultimately nations
make political decisions - whether to abide by agreements already
concluded, whether bilateral or multilateral. And this is one factor
that is most difficult to weigh: how to predict how a nation will act
after having agreed to certain limitations. Indeed, enforceability
has limits. There are punitive limits, that is, there is a point beyond
which the punitive measure is worse than the violation itself.
In diplomacy, as in international law, we must seek to promote
the process, the system in which states are given an incentive to
comply. Short of this, the likelihood of abrogation or violation of
agreements is great. I do not think we can banish power in interna-
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tional affairs. But what we can do is to use our power in the interest
of restraint. This, I believe, would be most consistent with the way
we perceive our national interests. But we could also use our power
to encourage settlement of disputes by negotiation. We could help
to construct equitable relations between nations and to bring about
a wider community of interests between nations. In short, we could
attempt to create the kind of world environment that encourages
nations to comply with a rational order.
This is a monumental task. And because it is a monumental
task, I would say as a matter of course that diplomats must be opti-
mists. You cannot have an agreement if you do not want one. I
would like to close with a short story to illustrate what I mean by
optimism. It concerns a family with two children. One of them was
a chronic optimist, the other a chronic pessimist. And to test the
children, the parents took the chronic pessimist and they put him
into a room; the room was full of beautiful toys and they closed the
door and left him there. To test the optimist, they put him in an-
other room which had nothing in it but one great big heap of horse
manure, and they closed the door and left him there. And a few
hours later they returned and they opened the door where the pessi-
mist was seated and they found him sitting in the middle of the
room with all the toys around him, crying because he was afraid to
touch any of the toys for fear of breaking them. They then went to
the other room and opened the door, and there was the optimist,
digging away like a madman into the pile of manure, saying all the
while, "With all this horse manure, there must be a pony some-
where." The diplomat must keep searching for the pony, and un-
fortunately the atmosphere in which he must work is not too
dissimilar from that described above.
Q. You mentioned the current role the public plays in the formula-
tion of foreign policy. Yet openness can destroy flexibility. How
should this dilemma be approached?
4. You are right, it is a dilemma. But I do not think it is beyond
solution. When I say that the practitioner of diplomacy must take
public opinion into account, I mean that he must understand the
role of the public in the process of making and executing foreign
policy. And I would say that what the diplomat must do is to be as
open as possible, to report regularly to the public, to engage the
public as much as possible through various means, including citi-
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zens' organizations. And I think that the government must reach
out. We possess today remarkable means of communication. To-
day, for example, the President went on television on half a day's
notice and announced the normalization of relations with China.
This was a profound step in the foreign policy of the United States,
one which is likely to be the subject of intensive debate. This deci-
sion must be explained to the public and the issues must be de-
bated. Personally, I think the view that opposed the move will be
very limited in intellectual capacity. Yet I am convinced that in the
end, as in the case of the Panama Canal, the results will be accepted
when the consequences become clear. One issue that seeks clarifi-
cation, and which the President must elaborate on, is the relation-
ship between the United States and Taiwan. I noticed today that
the press has been backgrounded. That means that someone who is
in a position to do so probably has explained to the press those
aspects of normalization that were not detailed in the communiqut
by explaining what the United States expects to happen. And there
are reasons to believe that the Chinese will not deny those explana-
tions. This was a useful diplomatic move. So the modern diplomat
cannot avoid public opinion, but he must understand it and use it
to his advantage. This he must do, because diplomacy cannot re-
turn to simpler days.
Q. You have underscored the need to tap public opinion at home.
Yet I cannot imagine too many decisions in the area offoreign policy
that do not also have a signyifcant impact on our friends abroad
What approach must we take toward our allies in the area offoreign
policy?
A. This aspect of the foreign affairs problem is extremely impor-
tant and deserves great attention. As a matter of fact, it is a neces-
sary condition to the implementation of foreign policy. And I think
we have learned from our mistakes in this area.
As you know, I served both the current and the past adminis-
trations, and I would say that both administrations understood well
the necessity of touching base with our Allies and in some cases
touching base with those who are not our Allies. My last service
before leaving government was to travel to Moscow to explain to
Mr. Gromyko exactly what the United States had in mind in the
Middle East in our support of President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.
Before going to Moscow I stopped in Britain. After Moscow, I
Vol. 9
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/12
PRACTICE OF MODERN DIPLOMACY
joined the Secretary in the Middle East, and we met with all inter-
ested parties. We met with our NATO Allies. This practice is an
essential element of modem diplomacy, and it must be continued.
Q. One aspect of world diplomacy in thepast has been the tendency
ofpowerful nations to impose their will on weaker nations. What role
does this form of diplomacy play in the present setting?
A. It is quite clear that the United States no longer has the power
to exercise the kind of brute diplomacy that we have exercised in
the past, and, I might add, that some would like to see exercised
today. It is a type of diplomacy that is still used occasionally, usu-
ally in concert with others against a weaker power. It is clear that it
cannot be used against major powers.
The United Nations can pass resolutions and thereby create
the threat of sanctions, but there is really little the United Nations
can do that would mean the difference between war and peace in
the Middle East, for example. The General Assembly resolutions
of yesterday calling upon nations to boycott arms sales to Israel
have no meaning in terms of war or peace in that part of the world.
This type of attempted coercion simply cannot be enforced.
At various times in our past, the United States has been able to
impose its will. But it is not a form of diplomacy that we like to
pursue. We have developed a high degree of concern about the
manner in which we behave, which is unusual for a country of our
strength. And in this I believe we are exemplary, and I do not be-
lieve that other powers do the same, either with their client states or
with smaller, less powerful states. So the imposition of will is not
the course which we seek. As I understand our diplomacy today, it
is more persuasive - it comes back to what I said earlier about
creating a situation in which there is an incentive for states to com-
ply with a rational order. In a rational order, the imposition of our
will cannot play a significant role.
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